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COMMENTS
Compensating the Handicapped: An Approach to
Determining the Appropriateness of Damages for
Violations of Section 504
Enacted as a relatively minor part of a comprehensive package of federal assistance programs for the handicapped,' section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" has become the principal
weapon in the fight for civil rights for the handicapped. This
statutory declaration of federal anti-discrimination policy, like
earlier prohibitions of discrimination based on races and sex,'
simply banned discrimination against the handicapped in programs receiving federal funds: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'"
For nearly one in eleven Americans: section 504 promised vastly

.

1. Section 504, as finally structured, was added by the House-Senate Conference
Committee. The section was not the subject of debate in the conference or on the floor of
either house. Those commentators who have suggested that the section has a substantial
legislative history have usually quoted from the general purposes of the statute and the
arguments of supporters in favor of its passage or have used comments made during
consideration of the 1974 and 1978 amendments. See, e.g., Note, Implied Rights of Action Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 68 GEO.L. J. 1229, 1245-46 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Implied Rights of Action].
2. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codifled in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Language similar to §
504 appears at 601 (§ 2000d): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."
4. Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX,20 U.S.C. 1681 (1976). Language similar to § 504 appears at 8 901 (5 1681(a)): "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . ."
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 8 504, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976).
COMMITTEE
ON EMPLOYMENT
OF THE HANDICAPPED,
ONE I N ELEVEN 2
6. PRESIDENT'S
(1975).
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increased access to government and society.
A general statement of a policy prohibiting discrimination,
however, could not, without an effective sanction or remedy,
bring the changes in government and society that the enactment
of section 504 contemplated. The promulgation of an Executive
order authorizing the withdrawal of federal funds from programs
discriminating against the handicapped7 did little to help those
who felt they deserved something more than they had received
under earlier federal statutes, which provided assistance programs but neglected handicapped rights.' Turning to the courts
to enforce section 504, handicapped citizens attempted to force
changes in such areas as mass transit planning: university handicapped assistance programs,1° and employment practices.ll
Each court hearing a section 504 suit initially faced the question
of whether a private right of action existed under section 504."
So far, "every court of appeals which [has] considered the issue
[has] found a private right of action under Section 504."18
Despite the courts' willingness to protect the rights of the
7. Exec. Order No. 11,914,3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 5 794 app., at
881 (1976).
8. The predecessors of the Rehabilitation Act, referred to as the vocational rehabilitation acts, did not address the question of the rights of the handicapped, but rather
concentrated on establishing programs to "rehabilitate" them, i.e., to make them employable in competition with non-handicapped persons. S. REP. NO. 318, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2078-79.
9. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
10. Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, - U.S. - (1981).
11. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. cal. 1979).
12. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not mention the existence of a private remedy for violation of 5 504. Before granting relief to private litigants, courts have been
forced to find that a private right of action was implied in the enactment of § 504.
13. Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, - U.S. - (1981). Despite the blanket assertion in Camenisch, two Circuit Courts of Appeals have found that private rights of action under § 504 do not exist
in some cases where the wrong to be remedied is employment discrimination. Carmi v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1980); Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978). Both courts based their decision on
the provision, added in 1978, that Title VI remedies would be available to 8 504 plaintiffs. 620 F.2d at 674-75; 590 F.2d at 89. That reasoning was explicitly rejected in a recent employment suit brought in a federal district court. Hart v. County of Alameda, 485
F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The problem involves Title VI's restriction of private actions in employment cases to those in which employment was the primary purpose of the
federal financial assistance. Since Title VI, unlike Title M,was aimed at employment
discrimination, the restriction serves a different purpose in Title VI suits. If it is to apply
at all in 8 504 cases, it should apply only to cases involving employment discrimination.
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handicapped by enforcing private rights of action under section
504, remedies for handicapped plaintiffs have been almost exclusively limited to prospective relief in the form of injunctions and
declaratory judgments.14 A few plaintiffs found that prospective
relief was not enough and asked to be compensated for the
losses they suffered as a result of the section 504 violations. In
decisions filed in early 1980, two United States district courts
came to opposite conclusions concerning the availability of damages as a remedy. This Comment suggests that the proper approach to deal with requests for damages for section 504 violations is found in Davis v. Passman,16 a 1979 U.S. Supreme Court
decision allowing damages in a constitutionally implied action
for discrimination based on sex.

A. Legislative History of Section 504
After several drafts, two Presidential vetoes,16 and
thousands of hours of research and negotiations Congress passed
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'' The Act's passage indicated
that the federal government had finally awakened to the needs
of handicapped citizens. The Act's predecessor, the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act,18 had been designed to direct federal assistance to those handicapped individuals who, with additional
training and assistance, could become employable.lS The new
statute was more comprehensive. It included assistance even for
those so seriously disabled that their employment was apparently impo~sible.'~
While the rest of the new Rehabilitation Act outlined a
14. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Loa Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980);
Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 12'7 (5th Cir. 1980), redd on other grounds,
-_ U.S. - (1981). NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Lloyd
v. Regional Tramp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
15. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
16. S. REP.NO. 318,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-16, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODECONG.
& AD. NEWS2076, 2087-90.
17. "The [Rehabilitation] Act thus represents the first federal attempt to prohibit
discrimination against the handicapped outside the civil service." Implied Rights of Action, supra note 1, at 1229 (footnotes omitted).
18. The "Vocational Rehabilitation Act" is the name popularly given to a series of
statutes passed between 1920 and 1968. For a history of the Acts, see S. REp. NO. 318,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2082-84.
19. Id. at 5, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWSa t 2079.
20. Id. at 9, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWSat 2092.
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comprehensive package of federally managed or assisted programs, section 504 addressed the civil rights of the handicapped
individuals to whom those programs were to be directed. Section
504's ban against discrimination extended beyond the Rehabilitation Act's programs, proscribing "discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assi~tance.'"~
That language was soon amended to include federally operated
as well as federally assisted programs within section 504's antidiscrimination mandate?
The broad language of section 504 paralleled earlier federal
efforts to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs receiving federal funds: Title IX2' required
schools to provide equal facilities for men and women;24section
504 forced institutions receiving federal funds to modify structures to provide equal access for blind, deaf, paraplegic, and
other handicapped individual^.'^ Administrative interpretation
of section 504 stipulated that "[elach program and activity [receiving federal funds], when viewed in its entirety, must be readily accessible to handicapped person^.'"^ Hence, new structures
would have to be built to accommodate any handicapped person
wishing to participate in the programs the structure would
house.27
The threat of huge financial burdens resulting from these
21. 29 U.S.C. 8 794 (1976) (emphasis added).
22. Congress added to the coverage of federally assisted programs "any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service."
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982
(amending 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1976)).
23. Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX,20 U.S.C.§ 1681 (1976).
24. Although Title IX did not explicitly refer to equal facilities, subsequent administrative interpretations consistently have required equal facilities for men's and
women's programs. For example, HEW regulations regarding athletic facilities require
the following:
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors:

....

(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services . . . .
34 C.F.R. $ 106.41(c) (1980).
25. U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH,
EDUC.AND WELFARE,
SECTION
504 OF THE REHABILITATION
GUIDE8 (1980).
ACTOF 1973: BRIEFING
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9.
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construction requirements led to considerable debate on the
merits of restricting the broad section 504 mandate." However,
whereas debate over Title IX resulted in the enactment of significant limitations on the reach of federal sex discrimination
bans into the functioning of the nation's schools," few limitations have been placed on the range of activities covered by section 504?O

B. Enforcement of Section 504
The legislative history of section 504 indicates that it was
modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972.31 Since Congress had not
included a method for enforcing section 504 in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the basic remedy used in enforcing Title VI
and Title IX was applied to section 504 by an Executive order
issued in 1976: "Whenever the appropriate department or
agency determines .
that any recipient of, or applicant for,
Federal financial assistance is in noncompliance . . compliance
with section 504 may be effected by the suspension or termination of, or refusal to award Federal financial assistance . . . 932
Under this enforcement scheme, funds were withdrawn from the
specific program found to be violating the statute's anti-discrimination requirement." Other programs operated by the same
agency or institution continued to receive federal assistance un-

..

.

.

9

28. The principal area of concern, primarily because of the amount of money involved, has been mass transit. See, e.g., Mass Transit for the Disabled, 66 A.B.A.J. 425
(1980). So far, 8 504 has not been amended to reflect that concern.
29. Title IX exempts a number of groups and institutions from its equal-opportunity mandate: religious institutions, military and merchant marine academies, single-sex
colleges, some fraternities, sororities and voluntary youth service organizations (such as
Boy Scouts), Boys' and Girls' State activities, father-son and mother-daughter activities,
and some beauty pageants. 20 U.S.C. 8 1681(a)(3)-(9)(1976).
30. It is important to note that the 8 504 mandate extended only to "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals. Although there is little in the legislative history to clarify
the meaning of this term, the Supreme Court has used it to limit the coverage of 5 504.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1979).
31. S. REP.NO. 1297,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [I9741 U.S. CODECONG.&
AD. NEWS6373, 6390.
32. Exec. Order No. 11, 914 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 8 794
app., at 881 (1976).
33. Id. at 3(c). A similar limitation was placed on Title VI enforcement. 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-1 (1976). For a discussion of the impact of that limitation in the Title VI context,
see Karst, Federal Remedies, 54 U. DET. J. URB.L. 1025, 1049 (1977). The same limitation has been imposed on actions for enforcement of Title IX.See Othen v. Ann Arbor
School Bd., No. 79-73709 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1981).
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ti1 they had each been shown to violate the requirement?
The relief provided by the Executive order, and later by administrative rules:' was limited to the withdrawal of or refusal
to provide federal funds to offending programs. For ongoing programs funding continued until a finding was made that discrimination had taken place, at which time federal assistance was discontinued. The remedy was entirely prospective; no provision
was made for providing relief to those who had already suffered
as a result of violations.
Even before the Executive order was issued, enforcement of
the section 504 mandate had begun. As early as 1976, suits by
private parties resulted in verdicts in favor of handicapped
plaintiff^.^^ Although the promulgation of regulations under section 504 in 1977 may have had some negative effect on private
section 504 enforcement actions," such actions continue to be
successfully litigated?
Private litigants prevailed in a number of federal district
courts and courts of appeals before Southeastern Community
College v. Daviss9presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to decide a section 504 case. Davis, a hearing-impaired
student, alleged that Southeastern Community College, a recipient of federal financial assistance, refused her application to
enter a nursing program because of her handicap.40 The Court
decided that Davis was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" within the meaning of the statute.41 By determining
that Davis' alleged right to enter the nursing program was not a
right protected by section 504, the Court avoided deciding the
question of the existence of a private right of action."
Had the Court decided the private right of action question
in Davis, it probably would have followed the precedent it had
set only four weeks earlier in a case involving sex discrimination
34.
35.
36.
1976).
37.

See id.
45 C.F.R. $8 85.1-.58 (1979).
The first 8 504 case was Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W.
Va.

Miener suggests that it may be more difficult to successfully pursue private actions for enforcement of 8 504 now that the administrative enforcement machinery is in
place. Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 944, 947 (E.D.Mo. 1980).
38. The most recent decision supporting the existence of a private right of action
under $ 504 is Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
39.
40.
41.
42.

442 U.S.397 (1979).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405-07, 413-14.
Id. at 404-05 n.5.
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in violation of a similar anti-discrimination statute, Title IX. In
Cannon u. University of Chi~ago,'~
the Court found that Congress' failure to specifically provide a private right of action did
not prevent the courts from finding that such a right did exist
when it was asserted under a statute focusing on a specific
benefitted class and when the plaintiff was a member of that
class.44The Court would presumably resolve a section 504 suit
by applying the Cannon approach to protect handicapped individuals in the same manner that women are protected under Title IX. The result would be to uphold the various circuit courts
of appeals in their decisions that a private right of action exists
under section 504. Partially as a result of its analysis of Cannon,
the circuit court that has most recently considered the question
concluded that "both the legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act and the analogy to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
. . . [support] the existence of [a private] right [of action].'"'

C. Remedies Available Under Section 504
Although federal courts have agreed that a private right of
action may properly be implied under section 504, there is still
considerable debate over the remedies available to those exerting such a right. The legislative history of section 504 makes no
reference to private remedies." Even when amending the statute
to specifically allow recovery of attorneys fees:' Congress did
not give any indication of the direction courts should take in
evaluating the appropriateness of different remedies. Although
courts have found injunctive relief to be appropriate where private rights of action have been upheld," they have not agreed on
the availability of compensation in the form of damages.
On January 25, 1980, two United States district courts were
43. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
44. Id. at 689-709,717.
45. Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d at 878. See also Patton v. Dumpson,
498 F. Supp. 933, 937 (1980).
46. In fact, there is little mention of 5 504 in the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act. The language in the committee reports simply suggests that the provision was
modeled after Title VI and Title IX and was intended to reach similar goals. S. REP.NO.
1297,93d Cong., 2d Seas. 39-40, reprinted in [I9741 U.S. CODECONG.
& AD. NEWS6373,
6390.
47. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978, 29 U.S.C. 8 794(a) (Supp. I11 1979).
48. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d at 880; Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d at 130.
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petitioned to provide a damages remedy for section 504 violations. Both cases involved handicapped children who had allegedly been denied appropriate educational opportunities by programs receiving federal financial assistance. Both courts faced
the issue on motions to dismiss the section 504 claims. One court
found that damages may be an appropriate remedy when a
cause of action under section 504 has been established; the other
court adamantly denied such a remedy.
1. Miener v. Missouri

The availability of a damages remedy was rejected by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
in Miener u. M i s s o ~ r i . ~Terri
@ Ann Miener was a child who
needed educational facilities that the local public schools (which
received federal funds) refused to provide.6oHer father sued the
State of Missouri and local school officials in her behalf, alleging
that the defendants had been discriminating against the plaintiff
because of her serious physical and emotional disorders." The
defendants moved to dismiss the section 504 claim on the
ground that a private right of action for damages did not exist
under section 504.62
The court conceded that, as the plaintiff had argued,
"[plrior to the adoption of [the section 5041 regulations, it was
generally held that Section 504 could be enforced through a pri~ court then distinguished Miener's
vate cause of a ~ t i o n . "The
claim from earlier suits in which handicapped individuals had
successfully asserted section 504 claims on two grounds: the earlier suits had been decided before regulations had been promulgatedM and they had not involved claims for damages."
In evaluating the validity of Miener's claim for compensatory relief, the court looked at the damages action in light of the
criteria outlined by the Supreme Court in Cort u. Ash? Applied
in virtually every implied right of action case since Cort was decided, these four criteria constituted the test to be used in deter49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

498 F. Supp. 944 (1980).
at 945-46.
at 945.
at 946.
at 947.
at 946-47.
at 948.
422 U.S.66 (1975).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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mining whether a private right of action could be found implied
in a statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" . . . ? Second, is there any indication of the legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one ? . . . Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff ? . . . And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . .

In Miener, the court found that the plaintiff was "undoubtedly" a member of the special class for which the statute had
been enacteds8 and that discrimination against the handicapped
was "not an area of primary concern to the States."se But the
court found that the legislative history of section 504 did not
contain "the slightest indication" that private damage suits were
contemplated by its enactment:O and that "[t]he implication of
such damage suits would also be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme."61 The court's application of the second and third Cort
factors led it to conclude that a private right of action could not
be implied. The plaintiffs claims under section 504 were dismissed, leaving the case to be tried on the remaining causes of
action.62
2. Patton v. Dumpson

Rather than join the Eastern District of Missouri in rejecting a claim for damages under section 504, the Southern District of New York found in Patton u. Dumpson6' that damages
could appropriately be granted to a handicapped plaintiff. The
fact situation was similar to that of Miener: A handicapped
child did not receive the education to which he was entitled
from an agency that received federal financial assistance." Because William Patton had been abandoned by his parents, he
57. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
58. 498 F. Supp. at 948.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 949. In another opinion, the Miener court found that even a grant of compensatory relief in the form of additional future educational assistance to Terri Ann
Miener would not be permissible. Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
63. 498 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. Id. at 936.
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was the legal responsiblity of certain public and private welfare
agencies in New York City.66 Suit was brought in his behalf
against those agencies, alleging that Patton had been "denied an
education solely because he suffered from certain physical and
mental handi~aps."~~
Rather than apply the Cort criteria, the Patton court found
that the existence of an implied right of action under section 504
had already been established by the various circuit courts of appeals that had considered the question.67 Then, separating the
question of the existence of the right of action from that of the
appropriate remedy, the court found that there was "no precedent for limiting a private right of action under Section 504 to
suits for injunctive relief in the absence of a Congressional directive to that effect."" Damages had been granted in cases involving "virtually every other statute designed to protect against unlawful dis~rimination."~~
Where the Miener court had found that the establishment
of a private right of action for injunctive relief could not be extended to cover a damages remedy, the Patton court pointed out
that earlier civil rights cases, whether arising under statutes or
the Constitution, provided "no support . . for the defendants'
position that the underlying right to sue should be limited by
the relief sought."70

.

A. The Power of the Federal Courts to Fashion Remedies:
Bell v. Hood
The availability of damages under section 504 depends on
the authority of the courts to fashion remedies in cases based on
rights of action implied rather than explicit in statutes. The Supreme Court has dealt with a closely analogous problem in cases
based on private rights of action implied in the Constitution. In
Bell u. Hood,ll the Court found that a damages remedy could be
65. Id. at 935 n.2.
66. Id. at 936.
67. Id. at 936-37.
68. Id. at 937.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 938.
71. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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appropriate when it was necessary to protect individual rights
implied in the Constitution. The Court spoke broadly of the
power of the federal courts to grant compensatory relieE
[Wlhere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it
is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.'=

The Court affirmed the Bell doctrine in two later cases. In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
N a r ~ o t i c sthe
, ~ ~Court pointed out that "[h]istorically, damages
have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interests in liberty."?' Bivens established the right of a
citizen to recover damages based on the Fourth Amendment.?'
The most recent extension of the broad Bell statement concerning authority to grant a damages remedy, Davis u. Passman,16 involved a damages claim asserted under the Fifth
Amendment.77 In Passman, the Court again looked at the history of damages remedies since Bell and attempted to distinguish between the question of implying a right of action and
that of determining the appropriate remedy to be granted once
the right has been found to exist: "[Tlhe question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and prior to
the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to
re~eive."'~The Passman Court criticized the court of appeals for
confusing the two questions, pointing out that "[a] plaintiff may
have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at
all."7e In other words, the Supreme Court outlined a two-step
approach to resolving the question of whether damages may be
an appropriate remedy for private rights of action based on the
Constitution: First, a court should determine whether or not the
72. Id. at 684 (footnotes omitted).
73. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 395.
Id. at 397.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 239. This distinction has been criticized. See 1980 B.Y.U. L.REV.165, 18079. 442 U.S. at 239-40n.18.
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right of action asserted by the plaintiff may be properly inferred
from the Constitution; and, second, if a right can be inferred, a
court should determine whether or not damages is an appropriate remedy.

B. Remedies in Statutorily Implied Rights of Action
The Supreme Court's two-step approach in Passman is
readily adapted to the determination of appropriate remedies
for rights of action implied in a statute. The Court's traditional
broad recognition of the federal courts' authority to choose between remedies was applied to cases involving statutorily implied rights of action as part of the argument in Bivens. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan relied on the federal courts'
general authority to fashion appropriate remedies for statutorily
implied private rights of action to justify the Court's determination that damages could be appropriate when the Constitution
was the source of the right:
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to accord a litigant damages for a claimed invasion of his federal
constitutional rights until Congress explicitly authorizes the
remedy cannot rest on the notion that the decision to grant
compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy considerations not susceptible of judicial discernment. Thus, in suits for
damages based on violation of federal statutes lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to
effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute.
. . . I do not think that the fact that the interest is protected by the Constitution rather than statute or common law
justifies the assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant
damages in the absence of explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy. . . [Tlhe federal judiciary [is] . . . competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies
to implement statutory and common-law policies . . . .80

.

Justice Harlan found his authority in a number of earlier decisions in which the Court granted relief in suits brought on the
basis of private rights of action implied in statutes. The principal authority cited by Justice Harlan was J. I. Case Co. v.
80. 403 U.S. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Borak,'l "an especially clear example of the exercise of federal
judicial power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in
the absence of any express statutory authorization of a federal
cause of action."82
The Court in J. I. Case decided a claim based on a failure to
comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934F The Act had
made various trading practices illegal without providing private
remedies for some of them? The Court recognized its duty to
"be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose" by finding that the effective
enforcement of the Act required more than the resources and
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission could provide? Private damage suits were found to be an appropriate
method of securing proper enforcement and effectuating the
stated goals of the statute?
Since J. I. Case, federal courts have taken a mixed view of
the appropriateness of granting damages in implied right of action cases.'' The differing results may be explained by the nature of the statutes and the rights they were designed to protect.
The courts have been more willing to recognize private rights of
action in cases based on statutes intended to protect individual
rights than in cases based on statutes designed for economic regulation." This distinction was most graphically illustrated in
1970, when the Supreme Court sustained a lower court's finding
that a private right of action was not implied in an economic
regulation statute? Only twelve days earlier the Court had held
that a private right of action was implied in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act,BOone of the statutes on which section 504 was
81. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
82. 403 U.S. at 402 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. 377 U.S. at 429-30.
84. See id. at 431-32.
85. Id. at 432-34.
86. Id. at. 434-35.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir.
1980) (private right of action denied under the Davis-Bacon Act); Zeffiro v. First Penn.
Banking and Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 294-98 (3d Cir. 1980) (private right implied under
Trust Indenture Act); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 233-35 (6th Cir. 1980) (private right of action implied under 1974 amendments to
the Commodities Exchange Act).
88. See Implied Rights of Action, supra note 1, at 1236-39.
89. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974) (decided Jan. 9, 1974) (no private right of action implied in the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970).
90. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (decided Jan. 21, 1974).
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modeled.
The Court's refusal to find implied actions in two 1979 decisions involving economic regulation:'
in contrast to its treatment of a civil rights case in the same year:2 suggests that the
distinction retains its validity. The two cases based on economic
regulation statutes showed the Court moving toward a strict
statutory construction approach to implied rights of action." On
the other hand, the Court did not use that strict approach when
it held that a private right of action was implied in Title IX.
Section 504 is the kind of civil rights statute that requires
the more liberal approach. The federal courts, applying the twostep analysis outlined in Passman, should recognize first that, as
various circuit courts have indicated, a private right of action is
implied in section 504 and, second, that damages may be an appropriate remedy for vindicating section 504 rights.

When a federal court finds that there is a private right of
action implied in section 504 and that damages may be an appropriate remedy, it must still determine whether or not damages should be allowed in the particular case with which it is
presented. Unlike situations in which Congress has explicitly
provided for a damages remedy, courts facing implied private
rights of action cannot simply say that compensatory relief is
appropriate and proceed to grant it.
The decision whether to grant damages, like that of the existence of the private right of action itself, depends on whether
the remedy is essential to achieve the statutory purpose. That
determination has two elements: First, the proof that there is no
mechanism provided which can achieve the purpose; and, second, the showing that the damages remedy would, given the policy considerations involved, achieve a purpose within the contemplation of Congress at the time the statute was enacted.
91. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
92. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (sustained a finding that a
private right of action existed under Title IX).
93. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 520, 568 (1979). See akro Comment, Implied
Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Lcrw
Power?, 51 U. COLO.
L. REV.355 (1980).
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A. Absence of a Mechanism to Enforce Section 504 Rights
1. Failure to provide an adequate statutory remedy

The Supreme Court has sustained damages awards where
"damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy
underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute."s4 In order to show that a damages remedy is "necessary," it is essential
that there be no statutory mechanism that can effectuate the
statutory purpose. The failure to provide such a mechanism may
be either direct or indirect. Congress may fail completely to provide a mechanism for relief, directly preventing the implementation of the policy without judicial enforcement? Or, Congress
may provide a remedy but limit it or its application in ways that
make vindication of the statutory right impossible. The limitations may be either a failure to provide the resources necessary
for enforcement (as in J.I. Case Co. u. Borakss) or a restriction
of the remedies granted to the enforcing agency to those
designed "solely to benefit the agencies themselves or the Federal government as a whole" (i.e., to enable agencies to comply
with the law) rather than to benefit those individuals to be protected by the statutory policy." When Congress so acts, it may
indirectly negate its own policy, often forcing the courts to produce means of enforcement.
Sometimes, however, in the situation where the statute itself does not provide a remedy, a remedy may be provided by
Executive order. But the Executive order may also fail to
achieve the purpose of the statute, and it may neglect to provide
an effective mechanism for the vindication of individual rights
guaranteed by the order. Or, even if an effective mechanism is
provided, there may be a failure to dedicate to that remedy the
resources necessary for its effectuation. Either failure would be
sufficient to make judicial provision of an effective remedy
66
necessary."
2. Failure of administrative and injunctive relief

Section 504 declared a federal policy opposing discrimina94. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at
402 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
95. See Implied Rights of Action, supra note 1, at 1236-37.
96. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
97. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 100 S.Ct. 960, 968
(1980).
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tion against the handicapped but did not specify a preventative
mechanism. The remedy provided by Executive Order No. 11914
for violations of section 504 was the withdrawal of federal funds
from the offending program." The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS)09has been unable to provide the kind of
supervision of federal grant programs necessary to ensure that
federal funds are not used in programs which discriminate
against handicapped persons. HHS is forced to rely on individual complaints to initiate investigations, and even when such
complaints are filed "there is 'a large backlog
and there is
no guarantee that any newly filed complaint can be investigated
and resolved in an expeditious manner.' "loo
Even if HHS could keep up with the incoming complaints
and effectively police federally funded programs, the remeily
provided by the Executive order is inadequate to provide relief
to those injured by section 504 violations.lol The situations
presented in Miener and Patton are illustrative. Terri Ann
Miener and William Patton had been deprived of appropriate

...

98. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 8 3, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 794
app., at 881 (1976).
99. Id. The responsibility for enforcement, originally delegated to the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, now resides in its successor, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).
100. Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. 461 F. Supp. 99, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Justice Department's amicus brief) (footnote omitted). A similar situation exists in
Title IX enforcement. "Federal enforcement has hardly been energetic: more than a hundred complaints are backed up and no school has lost a dime for noncompliance." Of
Sports, Sex and Money, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 16, 1981, at 98,100. Proposed cuts in budgets
of federal agencies, including HHS, will make reduction of the backlog difEcult if not
impossible.
101.
This cutting off of funds is, effectively, the only sanction that H.E.W. can
impose. Nowhere is the H.E.W. authorized to issue a binding order that damages be paid to an individual who has suffered by reason of a section 504 violation. Nor is the H.E.W. authorized to order the reinstatement of an individual
who has been discharged in violation of that section. Moreover, while an individual may file a complaint and thereby possibly trigger an H.E.W. investigation, he does not become a party to any proceedings between the H.E.W. and
the alleged violator. 45 C.F.R. 8 81.23. Indeed, the only relationship that he
may have with these proceedings is the receipt of a notice that an administrative hearing is going to be held to determine whether funds should be cut off.
In short, while the administrative process may effectively provide, by way of
the threat of a funding termination, an incentive to comply with section 504, it
provides no means by which an individual can obtain personal redress for a
section 504 violation. Thus, by their very terms, the regulations do not provide
a "meaningful enforcement mechanism" for the vindication of personal rights.
F. Supp. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted).
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educational opportunities for a number of years before their
suits reached trial.lo2Withdrawalof federal funds from their respective school systems, the only remedy open to HHS, would
do nothing to remedy their losses. In fact, withdrawal of funds
might prevent the school systems from providing future assistance to Miener, Patton, and other handicapped children by removing the resources necessary to provide that assistance; the
administrative remedy might be worse than no remedy at all.
Intervention by the courts would not change the situation;
withdrawing federal funds would not achieve the purposes of the
statute. If the courts refuse compensatory relief, they would in
effect be sanctioning the decision of the school systems to delay
compliance with section 504 until forced to do so by court order.
But refusal to end funding, without providing another remedy,
would be worse. It would sanction continued discrimination.
Such approval would defeat the purposes of section 504. Compensation in the form of damages, therefore, is arguably "essential" or "indispensable for vindicating" the rights guaranteed by
section 504.

B. Policy Considerations in Determining the
Appropriateness of Damages
1. Establishment of appropriate policy criteria: Passman
The traditional "necessity" test allows the courts to look not
only at the existence of statutory, administrative, and injunctive
remedies but at the policy implications of allowing a damages
recovery as well. This analysis is an essential part of the second
half of the necessity approach. The remedy must be necessary to
effectuate the congressional purpose. Mr. Justice Harlan pointed
out in Bivens that the necessity question was essential, but that
"[iln resolving that question, it seems . . that the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad
as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to
an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy."loS
The policy considerations involved in section 504 are significant. The indispensability of the damages remedy must be bal-

.

102. 498 F. Supp. at 945-46; Patton v. Dumpson, 425 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
103. 403 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 19 &
24, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)).

150

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

anced against the potential impact of that remedy on federally
funded programs. Even without the additional cost of providing
damages to victims of discrimination, recipients of federal funds
will spend millions of dollars complying with the section 504 requirements.lM The added burden imposed by making damages
available to handicapped plaintiffs requires that courts closely
scrutinize the facts giving rise to the damages claim.
The Supreme Court provided an outline of the policy considerations to be used in that scrutiny when it sustained a damages award in Davis v. Passman.lo6Davis had been employed on
the st& of United States Representative Otto Passman. Fired
from her position as deputy administrative assistant, Davis alleged that her removal was solely because of her sex.lO" Because
she was employed by the House of Representatives, which had
exempted itself from statutory coverage,lo7Davis was unable to
assert a statutory claim. The Court found her right of action implied in the Constitution.lo8
The Court in Passman used four criterialOe to evaluate the
merits of Davis' claim for compensatory relief. First, the Court
looked at the historical basis for recovery of damages in similar
suits.l1° Since courts have traditionally granted such recovery in
employment discrimination cases, the Court found no barrier to
a damages award in Davis' case. Second, the Court considered
the practicality of determining the amount to be paid as damages."' Again, the traditional use of damages as a remedy for
employment discrimination had given the courts sufficient ex104. For example, the cost of making the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority
facilities accessible to the handicapped would be at least $1.5 billion, plus an additional
$100,000,000 in maintenance costs. Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 30, col. 1.
105. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
106. After being dismissed from her position on Representative Passman's staff, Ma.
Davis received a letter giving the reasons for her dismissal:
"Certainly you command the respect of those with whom you work; however,
on account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the
diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to
my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you will agree with this
conclusion."
Id. at 320-31 n.3.
107. Although there was no specific exemption in the statute, it was carefully drawn
so as to exclude any coverage of congressional employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964,s 717,
42 U.S.C. 3 2000e--16 (1976).
108. 442 U.S. at 244.
109. Id. a t 245-48.
110. Id. at 245.
111. Id.
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pertise in determining the kind of backpay awards required in
damages recovery. The Court next reviewed the relevant legislative history of employment discrimination statutes for indications that Congress might have explicitly declared that such recovery could not be given."' Findy, since there was no such
statement in the history, the Court moved to consideration of
the impact that granting damages recovery in such cases would
have on the judiciary.l18 The Court rejected the contention of
the court of appeals that granting damages to Davis would
"delug[e] the federal courts with claims."ll4
2. Application of the Passman policy criteria to section 504

The use of the Passman criteria, applied as part of the
traditional necessity test, would provide federal courts with an
approach to determining whether damages would be an appropriate remedy for section 504 violations. This approach lies
somewhere between those taken in Miener and Patton. Miener
relied on the Cort criteria to simultaneously determine the question of the existence of a private right of action and the question
of the remedy to be granted.l15 Concluding that any damages
award would be inconsistent with the purpose of section 504,"'
the Miener court's approach neglected to address the policy factors essential to fairly answering the question of the necessity of
a damages remedy to achieve the declared purpose of section
504's broad mandate. The Patton approach, relying on the determination that Congress did not preclude a damages remedy"'
and that damages would be necessary to redress the wrongs allegedly suffered by William Patton,lla also ignored the essential
policy considerations that must enter into a determination of
the potential adverse impacta of section 504 damages awards.
The Passman approach would allow recovery of damages
only if the court were to find, after evaluating the appropriate
policy considerations, that damages were essential to achieving
the integration of handicapped citizens into programs as Congress intended. If necessity alone, without policy considerations,
112. Id. at 246-47.
113. Id. at 248.
114. Id.
115. 498 F. Supp. at 948.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 937-38.
118. Id. at 939.
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were to be the test, damages would be appropriate in all cases
because the mechanism set up to remedy section 504 violations
contains no provision for addressing individual wrongs. The addition of the Passman policy considerations qualifies that result,
allowing damages awards in those cases where they are consistent with the policies underlying the statute.
In the Miener and Patton situations, it is far from certain
that courts properly evaluating the four policy criteria would
grant damages. First, plaintiffs would have to show that damages have historically been awarded for the kinds of discrimination demonstrated. Although such proof may be found, it is certainly less extant than in employment discrimination cases such
as Passman. Second, the plaintiffs must show that damages
awards are "practical." Again, the difference between employment discrimination and the failure of a school system to provide educational opportunities is significant; although a court
can determine the wages a person has lost due to discrimination
in employment, there is no easy formula for determining the
value of lost educational opportunity. Can any award truly compensate for the years of educational assistance a plaintiff should
have received? Third, the plaintiffs will have to demonstrate
that the legislative history contains no indication that a damages
remedy was to be precluded-a point some have disputed when
looking at section 504's history, despite the lack of a clear indication of any legislative intent in passing the statute.ll@Finally,
the court will have to look at the impact allowing damages
would have on the judiciary. Despite the large number of prospective plaintiffs,120 the small number of damage suits brought
so far suggests that the burden on the judiciary of allowing damages under section 504 would not alone justify denial of this
remedy.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although federal courts have been willing to use injunctive
relief to protect the rights granted to handicapped citizens
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, they have
119. See, e.g., 498 F. Supp. at 948.
120. "The [I9701 Census also showed there were 11,265,000 persons [16 to 64 years
old] . . . with disabilities which existed for six months or longer. Excluded were persons
in institutions." PRESIDENT'S
COMM~IT
ONE EMPLOYMENT
E
OF THE HANDICAPPED,
ONE IN
ELEVEN
2 (1975).
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had trouble resolving the question of compensatory relief. The
courts that have faced the question have treated the issues of
the existence of an implied private right of action under the
statute and the appropriateness of a damages remedy as a single
issue.
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis u. Passman, although directed to a constitutionally implied private right of action, provides courts with a model for a step-by-step analysis of
the issue. The court should first determine whether a private
right of action can be fairly implied under section 504. Only if
such a right is found to exist should the court then proceed to
answer the separate question of the appropriateness of damages.
Davis u. Passman provides criteria that courts can use to
determine the appropriateness of damages in specific cases. The
court should consider the historical use of damages as a remedy
in similar cases, the practicality of determining the amount of
damages to be granted, the legislative history of the statute giving rise to the implied private right of action, and the impact of
the availability of a damages remedy on the judiciary. These factors provide the policy considerations that courts must consider
in deciding whether to extend the coverage of section 504 and
similar statutes to include compensatory relief.

James R. Layton

